Abstract-Shamir's secret sharing scheme is an effective way to distribute secret to a group of shareholders. The security of the unprotected sharing scheme, however, can be easily broken by cheaters or attackers who maliciously feed incorrect shares during the secret recovery stage or inject faults into hardware computing the secret. In this paper, we propose cheater detection and identification schemes based on robust and algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes and m-disjunct matrices (superimposed codes). We present the constructions of codes for cheater detection and identification and describe how the cheater identification problem can be related to the classic group testing algorithms based on m-disjunct matrices. Simulation and synthesis results show that the proposed architecture can improve the security level significantly even under strong cheating attack models with reasonable area and timing overheads.
INTRODUCTION

S
ECRET sharing is widely used in cryptographic applications to share keys or other important information among multiple shareholders [1] . In a secret sharing scheme, a secret S is divided into L shares and distributed to L shareholders by a trusted dealer. The shared secret S can only be recovered when l ðl LÞ or more than l shares are available. Such a scheme is called an ðl; LÞ secret sharing.
One of the most popular secret sharing scheme is the Shamir's secret sharing scheme proposed in [2] . The original Shamir's secret sharing scheme is not resistant to dishonest shareholders (cheaters) and malicious attackers. A cheater can manipulate the secret by providing incorrect shares or inject errors into the secret reconstruction network. It has been shown in [3] , [4] that by analyzing the fake secret and injecting errors, a cheater can completely break the security of the system and retrieve the real secret or generate a wrong secret.
Various methods have been proposed to protect secret sharing scheme in cryptographic applications against cheaters and attackers. In [3] , the authors showed that the probability for the cheater to succeed can be dramatically reduced by slightly modifying the Shamir's secret sharing scheme. In [5] , the authors proposed to use the idea of sub-secrets and sub-shares distributed by the shareholders such that each shareholder is also a dealer. In [6] , it was proposed to apply a one-way hashing function along with the use of arithmetic coding to detect cheating and identify the cheaters. In [7] , the authors proposed a computationally secure scheme based on RSA assumption for secret sharing.
A robust Shamir's secret sharing using error detection codes to detect cheating and malicious attacks is proposed in [8] .
In applications with high security requirement, it may demand to not only detect the presence of cheaters but also identify who these cheaters are. There are several methods for cheater identification described in the literature [4] , [7] , [9] , [10] . The dealer can generate and distribute additional information, such as using check vectors and certificate vectors for each shareholder. Error-correcting codes can also be introduced for cheater detection and identification such that faked shares can be treated as errors to be detected and corrected [4] , [11] , [12] . In [4] , the authors proposed to use more than l shareholders during the secret reconstruction thus the redundant shares can be used for cheater detection and identification in a ðl; LÞ Shamir's secret sharing schemes.
In this paper, we propose cheater detection and identification methods based on robust and algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes and non-adaptive group testing algorithms. Similar to [4] , for cheater identification we require more than l shareholders to participate in the reconstruction of the secret for a ðl; LÞ Shamir's secret sharing scheme. Instead of doing majority decoding as described in [4] , we analyze the syndrome computed by the corresponding error detection codes and identify potential cheaters using non-adaptive group testing techniques.
Compared to other cheater detection and identification methods presented in the literature, the proposed methods in this paper can work under a much stronger error model and can deal with not only cheating but also fault injection attacks. Moreover, to our best knowledge, this is the first paper to establish the connection between the cheater identification for secret sharing and the classical group testing theory using superimposed codes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, basic conceptions of Shamir's secret sharing will be reviewed and several cheating models used in this paper will be introduced. In Section 3, we discuss the architecture of the detection schemes based on robust and AMD codes. In Section 4.1.
We formalize the problem of cheater identification and show how it is related to the classical research area of group testing. In Section 4.2, we briefly introduce the concept of m-separable matrix, m-disjunct matrix and superimposed codes and show how they can be used to identify cheaters in Shamir's secret sharing scheme. In Section 4.3, we show that the presented cheater identification method using superimposed codes can tolerate undetected errors during the secret reconstruction stage. In Section 4. 4 , we present and analyze the cheater identification scheme based on superimposed codes constructed from maximum distance separable (MDS) codes and present the guidelines for the selection of parameters of the codes. In Section 6, we show the simulation and hardware synthesis results for the proposed cheater detection and identification methodologies.
BASIC CONCEPTIONS 2.1 Shamir's ðl; LÞ Secret Sharing
In a Shamir's ðl; LÞ secret sharing [2] , [3] , [4] , there are L shareholders P ¼ fP 0 ; P 1 ; . . . ; P LÀ1 g and a trusted dealer D. We use the shareholders' IDs ðz 0 ; z 1 ; . . . ; z LÀ1 Þ to denote each participant. Secret is generated and distributed to shareholders by the dealer D. Secret can be reconstructed based on Lagrange interpolation polynomial by taking any l shares ða i 0 ; . . . ; a i lÀ1 Þ of participants and their IDs ðz i 0 ; . . . ; z i lÀ1 Þ where fi 0 ; . . . ; i lÀ1 g f0; 1; . . . ; L À 1g.
Shamir's secret sharing scheme provides a method of hiding the secret such that any l or more participants would be able to reconstruct the original secret but any less than l participants would not be able to reconstruct the original secret. Assume all the computation are in GF ð2 n Þ ðL 2 n Þ, in which n is the number of bits of the secret, Shamir's secret sharing scheme consists of two algorithms [2] , [4] :
where S i ði 2 f0; 1; . . . ; l À 1gÞ and z belong to GF ð2 n Þ. S i ði 2 f0; 1; . . . ; l À 2gÞ are randomly generated in GF ð2 n Þ and S ¼ S lÀ1 is the secret. Each shareholder with ID z i receives a share aðz i Þ and we assume the IDs z i are publicly known and unique for each shareholder. We denote aðz i Þ as a i , and z i j as z j for simplicity in this paper, z i 6 ¼ z j . 2) Secret reconstruction algorithm For a polynomial of degree l À 1, with knowledge of at least l data points, we can reconstruct the exact polynomial using Lagrange interpolation in GF ð2 n Þ and thus reconstruct the secret S ¼ S lÀ1 . In this paper, we choose S lÀ1 as the secret for simplicity, and the equation for secret reconstruction is as following:
and equivalently
where c i ¼ Q lÀ1 j¼0;j6 ¼i ðz i þ z j Þ À1 . For a shareholder z i , we can represent the cheating by replacing a i byã i ¼ a i þ e i , where e i is the error injected by z i . A cheater can inject errors into his share and generate a fake secretS ¼ S þ e and he can precisely control the error e when the IDs z i are publicly known.
Cheating and Fault Injection Models
For Shamir's secret sharing, we assume that the dealer is honest and the shares distributed to the shareholders are not distorted. According to the definition of Shamir's secret sharing and the description above, any of these l shareholders can distort the secret by submitting a false share. In order to emulate the real cheating situations and estimate the security level of the proposed schemes, we consider four types of cheating models in this paper.
Type 1 Less than l shareholders are cheating and the output of the secret reconstruction module is hidden from the participants; Type 2 Less than l shareholders are cheating but there is a feedback from the output such that the cheaters can get information of the secret to help them to generate a fake secret at the next round; Type 3 All of the l shareholders are cheating and the output of the secret reconstruction module is hidden from the participants; Type 4 All of the l shareholders are cheating and there is a feedback from the output such that the cheaters can gain some knowledge of the secret to help them to cheat in the next round. In general, the more information the cheaters can gain, the stronger the resulting cheating model is. Among the above four models, Type 1 model is the weakest Type 4 model is the strongest. As shown in the Section 3, cheatings of types 2 to 4 can only be detected using AMD codes.
For fault injection attacks, we assume that the attacker has knowledge about the implementation of the hardware platform and can inject arbitrary stuck-at or bit-flip faults into the hardware that performs secret reconstructions. The attackers can use any available fault injection mechanisms [13] , [14] , [15] and can conduct fault injection attacks targeted for a specific portion of the hardware, e.g., the gates close to the outputs. However, the attacker cannot adjust the injected faults after observing the outputs of the secret reconstruction circuit. We also assume that the rate of fault injection is much lower than the clock rate of hardware for secret retrieval. The simulation results for protecting the secure Shamir's secret sharing against fault injection attacks using the proposed architecture are shown in Section 6.2.
SECRET SHARING WITH BUILT-IN SELF-ERROR DETECTION
The proposed architecture for cheater detection and identification is shown in Fig. 1 . The cheater detection block is composed of two sub-blocks. The secret reconstruction block will compute the secret according to the shareholder inputs.
The recovered secret will be verified by the secret checking block. We require the secret S to be a codeword of an error detecting code C, which can be written as S ¼ ðy; RÞ;
At the presence of cheaters, let the distorted secret beS. The error detection is conducted by checking whetherS is a codeword of C. An error is detected ifS 6 2 C. To identify the cheater, multiple secret reconstructions and error detections are performed. The error detection results are stored in a temporary buffer and passed into the cheater identification block. The cheater identification block will identify the cheaters according to the errors detected during the secret reconstruction stage.
Why Linear Codes Are Not Sufficient
For secure Shamir's secret sharing based on linear codes, the secret S generated by the dealer is a codeword of a ðn; kÞ linear code C ðS 2 CÞ, where n is the length of the code and k is the number of information bits. In secret reconstruction stage, errors can be injected into the shares by the shareholders to generate a fake secretS,S ¼ S þ e. For linear codes, the error is masked ifS is also a codeword of C ðS 2 C).
If the cheater has no knowledge of the code used in this architecture, he will successfully cheat the system with a probability of
Àr assuming that he injects error e in S lÀ1 with the same probability. However, one major weakness of linear codes used for security is that the sum of any two codewords is also a codeword. Therefore if the cheater has knowledge of the code C used in this architecture, he can bypass the detection with a probability 1 by injecting an error e into S such that e 2 C. Thus the secret sharing scheme based on a linear code is not secure against strong cheaters.
For example, if z 0 is cheating and other participants are not cheating, then he can inject an error e 0 into his share such that e ¼ c 0 e 0 2 C (see (2) ). Thereby with the knowledge of the linear code C, any single cheater out of l participants can cheat the system into reconstructing a wrong secret and bypass the detection with a probability of 1. 11001; 10111; 01110g and l ¼ 3 as a simple example. For the secret generation stage, denote the secret distribution polynomial as aðzÞ
where S 2 is the secret. If we assume the cheater knows the code that is being used, he also knows the equation for reconstructing the secret is
Assume the cheater z 0 can inject error e 0 into his share, the resulting output becomes
where e ¼ e 0
The probability of missing an error is 1 2 3 if the cheater has no information about the system. However, since z 0 ; z 1 and z 2 are publicly known, in order to bypass the protection by linear codes, the cheater only has to find an e 0 such that e 2 C. By injecting the corresponding e 0 , the cheater can guarantee that his cheating will be successful with probability 1.
Detection of Cheating with Robust Codes
According to the discussion in Section 3.1, it's obvious that linear codes are insufficient for the protection of a secure secret sharing module under strong cheating models. In order to improve the security level of the system, we will use robust codes [16] , [17] , [18] to protect the secret sharing module in this section.
For robust codes, the codewords have the form of ðy; fðyÞÞ y 2 GF ð2 k Þ; fðyÞ 2 GF ð2 r Þ. Error e ¼ ðe y ; e f Þ, ðe y 2 GF ð2 k ÞÞ; e f 2 GF ð2 r Þ is masked for a given y if
For good robust codes, the fraction of y satisfying (5) is very small for any error ðe y ; e f Þ [16] , [17] , [18] . For instance, when k ¼ 96, we can divide y into three parts ðy 0 ; y 1 ; y 2 Þ, y i 2 GF ð2 32 Þ; i ¼ 1; 2; 3. The redundant bits for robust codes can be calculated as
The number of redundant bits for the code is 32.
If an error ðe 0 ; e 1 ; e 2 ; e f Þ ðe i ; e f 2 GF ð2 32 ÞÞ is injected, the error masking equation is
then
Thus the probability of a nonzero error being masked assuming equiprobable y is Q rq ðeÞ ¼ Q rq ðe 0 ; e 1 ; e 2 ; e f Þ ¼ 2 Àrþ1 ¼ 2 À31 [16] , [17] , [18] . Suppose the secret is selected to be a codeword of the above robust code for the Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme. After the codeword is chosen, it can be easily verified in a similar way that randomly injected errors which are uniformly distributed will be detected with a probability of 2 Àr .
Example 3.2. In this example, we will show why Robust code is sufficient for Type 1 cheating model, but fails for Type 2-4 models. Under Type 1 cheating model, the cheater does not know S ¼ S 2 ¼ ðy; fðyÞÞ and thus cannot predict an error that can be injected without being detected with certainty.
In this example, we will use a system with 9 bits in the original secret and 3 bits redundancy to explain the robust code based system. The generating polynomial for GF ð2 3 Þ is x 3 þ x þ 1 and e 0 þ S 2 C to bypass the protection of the error checking module based on robust code, where C is the set of codewords of the robust code in equation (6) . Since z 0 ; z 1 ; z 2 ; S; C are all known, it is easy to work out the error e 0 which will cause an undetectable error.
For instance, to distort the secret intoS 2 ¼ ð011100011101Þ, the cheater needs to introduce an error such that e ¼ ð001011110110Þ ¼ e 0 1 ðz 0 þz 1 Þðz 0 þz 2 Þ . It is not difficult for z 0 to find out that an error e 0 ¼ ð111011110001Þ can be introduced into his share to achieve this.
Similarly, under Type 3 cheating model, the l shareholders can collaborate to work out the secret S and thus inject undetectable errors into the system. Once S is known, it will be easy for the cheaters to inject errors which can bypass the error checking module for the following rounds of secret retrieval. Under Type 4 cheating model, the cheaters can get information of S either from the feedback or collaboration. Thereby the robust code based scheme is not secure under Type 2-4 cheating models.
Detection of Cheating with AMD Codes
In this section, we will present an architecture based on algebraic manipulation detection codes [19] , [20] , [21] , [22] , [23] and discuss the proposed architecture under Type 2-4 cheating models.
For AMD code, a random vector x 2 GF ð2 m Þ; m ¼ tr; t 2 f1; 2; 3; . . .g will be generated and stored securely in the device such that it cannot be read by any cheater without destroying the device itself.
We note that it is generally not a good idea to store the information bits y of the secret in the secure memory since if a cheater reads the secure memory by destroying it, he can obtain knowledge of the secret y. This would allow outside cheaters to gain access to the secret without knowledge of the secret sharing scheme itself. However, if we only store the random bits x in the secure memory, even if this memory is read and the cheaters gain some knowledge of x by destroying the secret sharing module, our secret still remains secure.
The codewords ðy; x; fðx; yÞÞ of an AMD code consist of three parts, the message y 2 GF ð2 k Þ, the random vector x 2 GF ð2 m Þ, and redundant bits fðx; yÞ 2 GF ð2 r Þ. Since x is stored in the system and thus the secret S lÀ1 is in the form of ðy; fðx; yÞÞ. For this architecture, when the secret is reconstructed, the device will retrieve x from the secure memory and check if fðx;ỹÞ ¼fðx; yÞ;
whereỹ andfðx; yÞ are from the distorted secret,x is the distorted random number x.
With knowledge of y and fðx; yÞ, as well as the polynomial used to construct fðx; yÞ, the cheaters could work out a set of possible values for x. If x 2 GF ð2 m Þ; m ¼ r, and
, where y i ; x 2 GF ð2 r Þ, b is odd and y ¼ ðy 1 ; Á Á Á ; y b Þ, then the size of the set of possible x is at most b þ 2 [19] , [20] , [21] . To increase the security level of our system, the size of the random number in this system can be m ¼ tr where t ! 2 [19] , [20] , [21] , [24] . Here we use AMD code with t ¼ 2 and thus x ¼ ðx 0 ; x 1 Þ, x 0 ; x 1 2 GF ð2 32 Þ. Then the size of the set of possible x ¼ ðx 0 ; x 1 Þ will be much larger and thus improve the security level of the system. The same as robust code based scheme, y is also divided into three parts ðy 0 ; y 1 ; y 2 Þ (y 0 ; y 1 ; y 2 2 GF ð2 32 Þ) for the AMD code based system. The encoding polynomial used for AMD code in this system is
where y ¼ ðy 0 ; y 1 ; y 2 Þ. Assume the cheaters can inject errors into their shares and inject faults into the hardware system as well to distort x 0 ; x 1 . Denote the error for a set of ðy 0 ; y 1 ; y 2 ; x 0 ; x 1 ; fÞ as ðe 0 ; e 1 ; e 2 ; e x 0 ; e x 1 ; e f Þ. Then the error masking equation is:
All the computation are in GF ð2 r Þ. Equivalently
þ e f ¼ 0:
Since y is known and the errors are injected and controlled by the cheaters, (12) can be rewritten as
where A; B; C are functions of y and the error vector according to (12) . For any error introduced by the cheater, it is easy to see that the error masking probability for the above AMD code is no larger than 2 Àrþ1 assuming x is uniformly distributed.
Example 3.3. Let S ¼ ðy 0 ; y 1 ; y 2 ; RÞ and random bits x 0 , x 1 are stored securely. Choose ðy 0 ; y 1 ; y 2 Þ ¼ ð001001100Þ and
The cheaters wish to choose an error e such thatS ¼ S þ e 2 C. Under Type 2 to 4 cheating models, the cheater knows the secret S. However, without the knowledge of x 0 ; x 1 , the cheater still has no way to inject errors that are always undetectable by AMD codes. Given y ¼ ðy 0 ; y 1 ; y 2 Þ and R ¼ fðx 0 ; x 1 ; yÞ, there is only a limited number of x ¼ ðx 0 ; x 1 Þ that satisfies (10) . The cheaters can generate a set of all ðx 0 ; x 1 Þ satisfying (10) and inject errors that are undetectable by one of the x 0 s in the set. In this example, there are 5 possible ðx 0 ; x 1 Þ: ð001; 101Þ, ð010; 110Þ, ð100; 101Þ, ð011; 111Þ, ð101; 101Þ. Thus, the probability of successfully cheating is 1 5 , which is less than the upper bound 2 Àrþ1 ¼ 1 4 [19] , [20] , [21] .
When r is large, finding all possible x 0 and x 1 satisfying a given secret ðy 0 ; y 1 ; y 2 ; RÞ becomes unpractical. If the cheater randomly injects uniformly distributed errors into the share, it is easy to verify that the error masking probability can be as small as 2
Àr .
CHEATER IDENTIFICATION AND SUPER IMPOSED CODES
In this Section, we will show that the cheater identification problem for a ðl; LÞ Shamir's secret sharing scheme is tightly related to classical coding theory topics such as m-separable matrices and superimposed codes.
Cheater Identification
We increase the number of participants for secret reconstruction for a ðl; LÞ Shamir's secret sharing from l to N, l < N L. All the N participants will first submit their shares. Then the secret will be computed for A times using different subsets of l shareholders out of the N participants. During the whole period of secret reconstruction, no participants are allowed to re-submit their shares. Let M be a ðA Â NÞ cheater identification matrix where M i;j ¼ 1 if the j th shareholder participates in the i th secret reconstruction and M i;j ¼ 0 otherwise, 1 i A; 1 j N.
We assume that the cheating will cause the secret reconstruction to fail and will be detected by the corresponding AMD codes as described in the previous Section. Let u 2 GF ð2 N Þ be an N-bit binary vector, where u i ¼ 1 indicates that the ith participant is a cheater. Let m be the maximum number of potential cheaters. Then the weight of u (number of 1 0 s in the vector) is upper bounded by m. We define the syndrome T 2 GF ð2 A Þ of the performed A secret reconstructions to be
or equivalently
where j is the bitwise OR operation.
The following three statements follow from (14) and (15) .
When any of the shareholders participating in the ith secret reconstruction cheats, the secret reconstruction will fail and T i ¼ 1.
If the ith participant is a cheater (u i ¼ 1), then all the secret reconstructions he participates will fail. If more than 1 shareholder among the N participants cheats, the syndrome T will be the bitwise OR of the column vectors of matrix M that correspond to the cheaters. The following theorem follows directly from the above statements and describes the necessary and sufficient condition for identifying up to m cheaters based on M. Suppose the second shareholder is the only cheater, then u ¼ ð01000Þ
T . If the second and the forth shareholders are both cheaters, then u ¼ ð01010Þ
T , which is the bitwise OR of the second and the forth columns of M.
All of the columns in M are unique, thus all single cheaters can be identified based on M. However, the fifth column of M is equal to the bitwise OR of the second and the fourth columns. Thereby M cannot guarantee the identification of two cheaters.
Following the above analysis, the problem of identifying up to m cheaters for a ðl; LÞ Shamir's secret sharing scheme can be converted to the problem of constructing a ðA Â NÞ binary matrix M satisfying conditions in Theorem 4.1, where A is the number of secret reconstructions that need to be performed and N ! l is the total number of participants in all secret reconstructions. In the next Section, we will show that the desired matrix M is actually an m-separable matrix which is tightly related to other research topics such as m-disjunct matrices and superimposed codes.
Remark 4.1. In practice, the efficiency of the above cheater identification scheme is affected by the error detection mechanism. When errors are not detected, an erroneous secret will be re-constructed and the corresponding T i will be 0's, which may result in incorrect identification of cheaters. However, we note that the probability of missing errors can be made arbitrarily small by selecting a strong enough error detection mechanism (see Section 3). Moreover, the presented cheater identification methodology can actually tolerate some undetected errors. The cheaters can still be correctly identified even if not all erroneous secrets are detected during the secret reconstruction stage (see Section 4.3).
m-Separable Matrices, m-Disjunct Matrices and Superimposed Codes
m-separable matrices, m-disjunct matrices and superimposed codes [25] are classical coding theory topics that are well studied in the literature and widely adopted for different applications such as group testing [26] .
Definition 4.1. [25] A binary matrix is m-separable if the logical sum of up to m columns are mutually different.
We note that the necessary and sufficient conditions for M to identify up to m cheaters described in Theorem 4.1 is coherent to the definition of m-separable matrix. As a result, the following Corollary holds. In [25] , it has been shown that an m-disjunct matrix, which also defines a superimposed code, is always an m-separable matrix.
Superimposed codes can be constructed from conventional error correcting codes such as Reed-Solomon codes and Hamming codes [25] . C ¼ fð0; 0; 0Þ; ð1; 1; 1Þ; ð2; 2; 2Þ; ð0; 1; 2Þ; ð1; 2; 0Þ; ð2; 0; 1Þ; ð0; 2; 1Þ; ð1; 0; 2Þ; ð2; 1; 0Þg:
Suppose 0; 1; 2 in GF ð3Þ are represented by binary vectors ð100Þ, ð010Þ and ð001Þ respectively, then the binary code C 0 consists of 9 codewords shown as the columns in the following 2-disjunct matrix. The binary code C 0 has length 9, Hamming distance 4 and contains the same number of codewords as the original ternary code C. The code C 0 is a 2-superimposed code and it is easy to verify that the bitwise OR of any two sets of up to two columns are mutually different. Each row of the above matrix contains exactly three 1 0 s.
Thereby
To identify cheaters for a ðl; LÞ Shamir's secret sharing scheme, each row of the matrix M has to contain exactly l 1 0 s. We note that for the m-superimposed codes constructed from q-ary linear codes based on Construction 4.1, this property is always satisfied. To prove this statement, we first start with the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. For any q-ary linear error correcting codes, every single non-constant redundant digit takes values from GF ðqÞ with a probability of q À1 .
Proof. Let C be a q-ary linear error correcting code. Denote by c 1 ; c 2 ; Á Á Á c k the information digits and c kþ1 ; c kþ2 ; . . . ; c n the redundant digits in the codewords. For linear codes, all the redundant digits can be represented as linear functions of the information digits. Let
where
. . . c k , there is exactly one solution for c 1 that satisfies the above equation. As a result, for any element v in GF ðqÞ, the probability that
According to Lemma 4.1, for any element v in GF ðqÞ, any non-constant redundant digit of a q-ary ðn q ; k q ; d q Þ q code C is equal to v for exactly q k q À1 codewords. After converting the q-ary code C to the m-superimposed binary code C 0 as described in Construction 4.1, any single redundant digit corresponds to a q Â N submatrix. Since different binary vectors of Hamming weight 1 are used to represent the elements in GF ðqÞ, it is easy to verify that each of this q rows contains exactly q k q À1 1 0 s. The locations of these ones correspond to codewords in the original code C that have the same value for this particular redundant digit.
Similarly, we can show that all the rows in M corresponding to the information digits in the original code q-ary code C also contains exactly q k q À1 1 0 s. Thereby we have the following corollary. The matrix M constructed from superimpose codes is not only m-separable but also m-disjunt. No single column h will be covered by the bitwise OR of up to m-columns other than h. Moreover, the number of 1 0 s in each column of M is exactly n q assuming we represent each element in GF ðqÞ by a q-bit binary vector with Hamming weight 1. This property results in a simple error locating algorithm as shown in the next Theorem. 
Tolerance of Undetected Errors in Cheater Detection Stage
As mentioned in Section 3, the input to the error identification network is an A-bit binary vector representing the error detection results. A '1' in the binary vector stands for a detected error during the secret reconstruction stage. We note that for cheater detection method based on error detection codes, there are small chances that errors (cheaters) will not be detected in one or more secret reconstructions. However, since the binary code composed of the columns of M has a Hamming distance of 2d q (see Construction 4.1 and Example 4.2), it can correct up to d q À 1 bit errors. Thereby, even if some erroneous secrets are not detected during the secret reconstruction stage, we may still be able to identify the cheater as stated in the following Theorem. Proof. When there is a single cheater, the A-bit syndrome is a column of the cheater identification matrix M assuming all errors are detected. The weight (the number of 1 0 s) of the syndrome is exactly n q . When there are more than one cheater, the syndrome is the bitwise OR of multiple columns in the matrix M. It is easy to verify that the weight of the un-distorted syndrome at the presence of multiple cheaters is at least n q þ d q . Undetected secret reconstruction failures will result in 1 ! 0 unidirectional errors in the syndrome. The weight of the distorted syndrome will be strictly smaller than the weight of the correct syndrome. Suppose up to d q À 1 errors are missed during the secret reconstruction stage, the weight of the syndrome will be in the range of ½n q À d q þ 1; n q Þ if and only if there is a single cheater. The correct syndrome can be recovered after the undetected errors are corrected by the code composed of all columns of M, which has a Hamming distance of 2d q . After this the single cheater can be identified by comparing the syndrome to the columns of matrix M. t u Example 4.4. In Example 4.2, the binary code C 0 has a Hamming distance of 4. It can correct any 1-bit error. Suppose m ¼ 1 and the second participant cheats. Then the second, the fifth and the eighth secret reconstructions will be affected. If all errors are detected, the syndrome is ð010010010Þ. Without loss of generality, we assume the error in the second secret reconstruction is not detected, then the distorted syndrome becomes ð000010010Þ. Since C 0 has a Hamming distance of 4, ð000010010Þ can be easily corrected to ð010010010Þ using the classical maximum likelihood decoding algorithm. After correcting the 1-bit error in the binary vector, the cheater can be successfully identified.
Let P M be the probability that errors in a single secret reconstruction is not detected. Since up to d q À 1 bit errors in the syndrome can be tolerated for detecting single cheaters, the probability P I of successfully identifying a single cheater for any m can be calculated as follows.
As discussed in the previous Sections, for error detection using robust codes or AMD codes, P M will decrease exponentially as r increases. Thereby for large r, e.g., r ¼ 32, P I will be extremely close to 1. In this case single cheaters are almost always successfully identified by the proposed cheater identification algorithm. (See Section 6.) Remark 4.2. Theorem 4.3 can be further extended for identifying multiple cheaters at the presence of undetected errors during the secret reconstruction stage. In general, let C t be a code that consists of all the vectors that are the bitwise OR of t columns in the matrix M. Let d C t be the Hamming distance of C t . Then t cheaters can be potentially identified at the presence of up to b
2 c undetected errors. For instance, when t ¼ 2 and n q ¼ 4, it is easy to show that d C 2 is 2n q À 4 ¼ 4. Double cheaters can still be successfully identified when there is one undetected error.
From Corollary 4.2, it is easy to show that when q; n q ; k q are fixed, linear error correcting code with larger Hamming distance d q will result in stronger superimposed codes with bigger m. When C is a maximum distance separable code that meets the Singleton bound [27] 
k q À1 c. The parameters of the cheater identification scheme constructed from various MDS codes will be studied in the next Section.
Cheater Identification Based on Superimposed Codes Constructed from MDS Codes
The most well known non-trivial MDS codes are Reed-Solomon codes, extended Reed-Solomon Codes and the shortened version of these codes [27] . For any q ¼ p v , where p is a prime and v is a positive integer, there exist
Reed-Solomon codes for 1 k q n q À 1. When k q ¼ n q À 1, the Reed-Solomon codes coincide with the trivial MDS codes -the 1-d parity codes. The constructions of extended Reed-Solomon codes with parameters ðn ¼ q þ 1; k q ; d q ¼ n q À k q þ 1Þ can be found in [27] . The shortened versions of both the original and the extended Reed-Solomon codes can be constructed by deleting any number of information digits from the codes. The resulting code has parameters ðn
These shortened codes still meet the Singleton bound and are also MDS codes.
Maximizing m for Fixed q
From Corollary 4.2, the number of shareholders l needed for secret recovery for the Shamir's scheme and the cheater identification capability m can be written as functions of the parameters of the MDS codes, i.e., l ¼ q kaÀ1 ,
k q À1 c. Table 1 shows m and l resulting from Reed-Solomon codes, extended Reed-Solomon codes and shortened ReedSolomon codes constructed over GF ð5Þ (q ¼ 5). We note that m ¼ b nqÀ1 k q À1 c is an increasing function of the ratio of n q over k q . To achieve a stronger cheater identification capability, we should select n q to be as large as possible and k q to be as small as possible. The selection of k q is independent of the selection of n q . (Once n q is fixed, k q only affects the distance of the MDS codes.) The extended version of the ReedSolomon codes with n q ¼ q þ 1 and k q ¼ 2 will maximize n q and minimize k q simultaneously and is always the best option to maximize the cheater identification capability once q is fixed. Remark 4.3. Given q and n q , minimizing k q will maximize the Hamming distance of the MDS codes. It is not surprising that increasing the cheater identification capability m is coherent with increasing the error correcting capability of the MDS codes, which is determined by the Hamming distance of the codes.
Minimizing the Hardware Overhead Given m
The hardware overhead of the cheater identification scheme constructed by Construction 4.1 increases as either A or l increases. The former affects the number of secret recoveries that need to be conducted for cheater identifications. The latter determines the amount of computations required for each round of secret recovery. When q is fixed, A is a strictly increasing function of n q and l is a strictly increasing function on k q . To minimize the hardware overhead, k q and n q should be as small as possible. Since m ¼ b nqÀ1 kqÀ1 c, for any given m minimizing k q and n q are coherent with each other. Thereby, the smallest k q such that there exists n q satisfying m ¼ b nqÀ1 k q À1 c should be selected to minimize he hardware overhead for any given m. Example 4.6. In Table 1 , there are three sets of n q ; k q ; d q that achieve m ¼ 2, which are
Among these three alternatives, n q ¼ 3; k q ¼ 2 and d q ¼ 2 results in the smallest l and A ¼ qn q (see Table 1 ). It requires the least hardware overhead to identify up to two cheaters.
The former analysis can be used to minimize the hardware overhead for a specific m once q is fixed. The hardware for the cheater identification scheme based on superimposed codes constructed from MDS codes, however, not only depends on n q ; k q ; d q but also depends on q itself.
For a specific m, the question of how q should be selected is not yet answered. To answer this question, we start with the following two observations. m is independent of q. The minimum k q and n q for any q are always 2 and 3 respectively, which results in m ¼ 2.
Corollary 4.4. For any given q and any m; 1 m q, a Shamir's secret sharing scheme that is able to identify up to m cheaters can be constructed from RS codes over GF ðqÞ (The RS codes may be shortened or extended.) Let U q;m be the set of parameters n q ; k q ; d q for RS codes over GF ðqÞ that can be used to identify up to m cheaters. Then U q 1 ;m & U q 2 ;m if q 1 q 2 , m q 1 .
Example 4.7. Table 2 shows m and l that can be achieved using superimposed codes constructed from RS codes over GF ð4Þ. The range of m is from 1 to 3. For m ¼ 2, there are two sets of parameters for RS codes, which are 2  5  25  3  15  2  2   3  5  25  4  20  2  3  1  25  125  4  20  3  2  1  25  125  4  20  3  2  2  25  125  5  25  3  3  1  125  625  5  25  4  2  2  25  125  6  30  3  4  1  125  625  6  30  4  3  1 
Both of these two sets also appear in Table 1 for m ¼ 2. Moreover, Table 1 contains a third set which also results in m ¼ 2 (see Example 4.6). Thereby, U 4;2 & U 5;2 .
Since the number of tests A required for cheater identification is proportional to q, the smallest q should be selected to reduce A thus minimize the hardware overhead.
We note that the number of secret reconstructions that need to be performed to identify cheaters in the N participants for a ðl; LÞ Shamir's secret reconstruction scheme is always N l À Á regardless of m for the method presented based on majority voting in [4] . From Tables 1 and 2 , it is easy to see that the proposed cheater identification method based on superimposed codes in general requires much less secret reconstructions than N l À Á .
CHEATER IDENTIFICATION SCHEMES THAT MINIMIZE THE NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS N
We note that the cheater identification scheme presented in the previous section requires a larger number of participants N. In this Section, we will present an alternative method which requires less participants N at the cost of larger number of tests A.
In Example 4.6, we have seen that five participants are enough for identify a single cheater for any ðl; LÞ Shamir's secret sharing scheme, where l ¼ 4 and L > ¼ 5. This method can be generalized for any l and L; L > ¼ l þ m as shown in the next Construction. Proof. If the number of participants N is less than m þ l, any round of secret reconstruction will contain at least one cheater. When N ¼ l þ m, then only one subset of l shareholders can retrieve the correct secret. The other m shareholders participating in the secret reconstruction will be cheaters. Thereby, the minimum number of participants needed to identify m cheaters is
Generally speaking, the cheater identification scheme based on Construction 5.1 has smaller N but larger A compared to the scheme based on Construction 4.1, which is shown in the next Example.
Example 5.1. For m ¼ 2; l ¼ 4; N ¼ 6, the following 2-disjunct ð14 Â 6Þ matrix M will be used to identify two cheaters according to Construction 5.1. The total number of required secret reconstructions is 14. In Table 2 , it is shown that the cheater identification scheme based on Construction 4.1 only requires 12 tests. However, for Construction 4.1 the number of participants is 16 and is more than doubled compared to Construction 5.1
SIMULATION AND SYNTHESIS RESULTS FOR DETECTION OF CHEATING
In this section, we will present the simulation results to justify the security level of the proposed secure Shamir's secret sharing scheme. We will also show the synthesis results for the proposed architecture to estimate the required timing and area overhead.
Simulation Results for Detection and Identification of Cheating
We will present the simulation results under Type 1 cheater model for the proposed cheater detection and identification methods based on robust codes, AMD codes and superimposed codes. Secure Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme using robust codes can only provide sufficient protection against Type 1 cheater. A cheater of Type 2, 3 or 4 can easily introduce an error that is always not detectable by robust codes. Secure Shamir's Secret Sharing Scheme using AMD codes can provide high protection against all types of cheaters. Without the knowledge of x, knowing the secret or collaborating with other cheaters cannot increase the chance for the cheater to inject undetectable errors. Thereby, the simulation results presented in this Section can also be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed architecture using AMD codes under other types of cheater models. We implement a ðl ¼ 4; L ¼ 16Þ secure Shamir secret sharing scheme based on the proposed architecture in C++. The design is capable of identifying up to two cheaters. The share generation and the secret reconstruction equations can be easily derived from Section 2.1 for l ¼ 4. We select the secret to be 128 bit. The generator polynomial of GF ð2 128 Þ is
The length of the codewords for the chosen error detection codes is determined by the length of the secret, which is 128-bit. The number of information bits and the Galois field in which the code is constructed, however, can be selected according to the required security level. To compare the performance of secure Shamir secret sharing schemes based on different error detection codes, we considered and implemented designs using different robust and AMD codes as shown below.
Robust codes defined over GF ð2
32 Þ with k ¼ 96, r ¼ 32 and fðyÞ ¼ y 0 y 1 þ y 3 2 ; AMD codes defined over GF ð2 32 Þ with k ¼ 96; r ¼ 32, 64 bit random data and fðy; xÞ
Robust codes defined over GF ð2 16 
To identify up to two cheaters, we use the ð12 Â 16Þ cheater identification matrix constructed from a ð3; 2; 2Þ 4 Reed Solomon code shown in Fig. 2 . Twelve secret reconstructions need to be performed in order to identify the cheaters. Every secret reconstruction requires four shareholders. Each shareholder will participate in three reconstructions. A total number of 16 participants are required by the proposed secure Shamir's secret sharing scheme to recover the secret.
For the secure Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme based on each of the above four error detection codes, we perform the following simulation steps 1) Randomly generate 50 sets of share holder IDs and coefficients S 0 ; S 1 ; S 2 and S 3 , where secret S ¼ S 3 is a random non-zero codeword of the selected code; 2) Compute the shares and distribute them to the share holders; 3) For each set of IDs and secrets, perform 1 million rounds of random cheats. For each round of the cheat, randomly select one or two cheaters among the 16 participants. Randomly generate errors and inject the errors into shares of the cheaters; 4) Conduct error detection and cheater identification in the existence of cheaters. Summarize and categorize the undetected errors and unidentified cheaters.
When robust codes and AMD codes are constructed over GF ð2 32 Þ, the error masking probabilities are extremely small (see Section 2) . During the simulation, all errors are successfully detected at the secret reconstruction stage. All the cheaters are correctly identified by the cheater identification algorithm presented in Theorem 4.2.
The simulation results for the proposed cheater detection and identification scheme using error detection codes constructed over Gð2
16 Þ are shown in Table 3 . For both robust and AMD codes constructed over GF ð2
16 Þ, the probability of not detecting an error during the secret reconstruction stage is close to 2 À16 assuming the cheater inject random errors into the share.
In Theorem 4.3, we have shown that the proposed cheater identification can still successfully identify single cheaters at the presence of up to d q À 1 undetected errors. This is verified by the simulation results. The chosen ReedSolomon code has d q ¼ 2. Thus the resulting cheater identification scheme can tolerate up to one undetected error. For robust codes and AMD codes constructed over GF ð2
16 Þ, the probability of having two undetected errors is very small. (It is comparable to the error masking probability for codes constructed over GF ð2 32 Þ.) All single cheaters are successfully identified during the simulation.
When there are two cheaters, in most situations we correctly identified one out of two cheaters. There are few cases where both cheaters are missed. The overall probability of unidentified cheaters has an order the magnitude of 10 À5 when two shareholders cheat.
In general, the probability of not detecting cheaters is reduced when the error masking probability for the error detection codes decreases. To better understand the relationship between the two, we performed simulations to evaluate the probability of not detecting cheaters under different error masking probabilities. During the simulation, the error masking probability P M is changed from 2 À1 to 2 À32 . For each error masking probability P M , we intentionally miss the fake secrets caused by the cheaters with a probability of P M . 10 millions cheater identification simulations are performed for each fixed P M . The results are shown in Fig. 3 . The X-Axis is Àlog 2 ðP M Þ. The Y-Axis is the probability of not detecting cheaters. It is clear that when the error masking probability decreases, the probability of unidentified cheaters is drastically reduced. When log 2 ðP M Þ À29, all the cheaters are successfully identified during the simulation. This is consistent with the simulation results presented earlier for codes constructed over GF ð2 32 Þ.
Simulation Results for Detection of Fault Injection Attacks
Besides cheating, the attackers may also directly inject faults into the hardware to distort the output of the secret reconstruction platform computing the secret [28] , [29] , [30] . The proposed architecture is also resistant to fault injection attacks. In this section, we will describe the fault injection simulation results to justify the effectiveness of the proposed architecture as a countermeasure against fault injection attacks on the secret reconstruction hardware. We assume the attacker has knowledge of the hardware implementation of the Shamir's secret sharing scheme and can conduct fault injection attack targeting for gates close to the output of the circuit. The attacker has no access to the reconstructed secret (similar to Type 1 cheaters). In the fault injection simulation, we added "control signals" to the gate models for gates close to the output of the circuit. The fault types can be changed by changing the values of the control signals. The secret is fixed during the simulation. We randomly inject stuck-at-0, stuck-at-1 and bit-flip faults into 1 to 5 gates close to the outputs of the secret reconstruction hardware. Fifteen groups of faults are injected into the hardware. For each group of injected faults, we perform one million secret reconstructions for different IDs and shares generated from the secret at the presence of these faults. The simulation is conducted for secure Shamir's Secret Sharing scheme based on robust and AMD codes constructed in both GF ð2 32 Þ and GF ð2 16 Þ. We calculate the fault detection probability as the ratio between the detected faults and the total number of faults manifested as non-zero errors at the output of the hardware. Silent faults that do not alter the outputs of the hardware have no effects on the secret reconstruction and are not counted when computing the fault detection probability.
Similar to the simulation results for the detection and identification of cheating, all manifested faults are successfully detected by robust and AMD codes constructed over GF ð2 32 Þ. The simulation results for codes constructed over GF ð2
16 Þ are shown in Table 4 . Since the faults are not directly injected to the outputs but to nearby internal gates, they are less likely to alter the output if only one or two gates are affected by the faults. From the Table we can see that all manifested single faults are detected by the codes. As the number of affected gates increases, the fault masking probability slightly increases but still has an order of magnitude of 10 À5 . Thereby, the proposed architecture based on robust, AMD and superimposed codes can effectively protect the Shamir's secret sharing scheme against not only cheaters but also fault injection attacks.
We note that robust codes may not be sufficient to provide a satisfactory security level if the codewords are not uniformly distributed [31] or the attacker can conduct biased fault injection attacks [32] . For more advanced attackers who can gain knowledge of the outputs of the secret reconstruction device and can precisely control the injected faults according to the outputs, the security level of Shamir's secret sharing scheme based on robust codes cannot be guaranteed. Under such strong attacker models, AMD codes should be used whose security level is ensured by the use of random data for encoding and decoding. Fig. 3 . The probability of unidentified cheaters versus the error masking probability. 
Synthesis Results for the Proposed Architectures
The proposed secure secret sharing architecture protected by robust and AMD codes constructed in both GF ð2 16 Þ and GF ð2 32 Þ are synthesized to estimate the timing and area overhead. The architecture is mainly composed of three parts, the secret reconstruction module, the error checking module, and the cheater identification module (see Fig. 1 ). These three modules have been modeled in Verilog and synthesized in Cadence Encounter(R) RTL Compiler with the Nangate OpenCell Library revision 1.0. The designs were placed and routed using Cadence Encounter Compiler. The power and the areas of the proposed schemes were estimated under a supply voltage of 1.25 V.
The original secret reconstruction module does not have any error checking mechanism for the reconstructed secret. In the proposed secret sharing module, the secret will be encoded into codewords of Robust or AMD codes. When codes are constructed in GF ð2 32 Þ, the length of the secret is 96 bits and the number of redundant bits for the code is 32 bits. When codes are constructed over GF ð2 16 Þ, the length of the secret and the number of redundant bits are 112 and 16 respectively. The synthesis results for these two cases are shown in Tables 5 and 6 .
Most of the area and power consumption are consumed by the secret reconstruction stage, which requires multiplications and inversions in GF ð2 96 Þ and GF ð2 112 Þ for architecture protected by 32-bit and 16-bit codes respectively. The error detection stage requires arithmetic computations in a much smaller field (GF ð2 32 Þ or GF ð2 16 Þ) and has much smaller computational complexity. The cheater identification only needs binary operations. For the cheater identification matrix shown in Fig. 2 , the cheaters can be identified after multiplying a 12-bit vector by the ð12 Â 16Þ binary matrix. This component requires the least hardware overhead among the three parts of the secure Shamir's secret sharing architecture.
In our implementation, the secret recovery for the unprotected Shamir's secret sharing scheme is completed in 12 clock cycles. For secure Shamir's secret sharing scheme protected by robust or AMD codes, the error detection takes four clock cycles. To identify cheaters, multiple rounds of secret reconstructions and error detection are needed. After the syndrome is obtained, the cheater identification can be completed in one clock cycle.
In summary, the proposed architecture can effectively identify cheaters and protect the Shamir's secret sharing scheme against fault injection attacks at the cost of reasonable hardware overhead.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we described a cheater detection and identification methodology for Shamir's secret sharing scheme based on robust codes, algebraic manipulation detection codes and m-disjunct matrices (superimposed codes). The constructions and the hardware implementations of the proposed codes are presented. The connections between the cheater identification for Shamir's secret sharing and the classic group testing theory based on superimposed codes are established. A method for identifying cheaters based on m-separable matrices and superimposed codes is presented. We analyzed the security level of the proposed schemes under different cheating models and also ran fault injection simulation to test the security level of the proposed schemes. Results show that the proposed method can increase the security level of the system and protect the system against strong cheaters and fault injection attacks at the cost of a reasonable increase of the hardware complexity. His research is focused on developing new error correcting codes for the reliable systems requiring strong fault tolerance and low overhead. He also does research on using non-linear codes to enhance the security of various devices by detecting artificial fault injections from attackers.
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